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What’s So Great About
the Declare War Clause?
M AT T H E W C . WA X M A N
Review of Noah Feldman, The Three Lives of James Madison: Genius,
Partisan, President (Harper Collins, 2017)

I

book, but they are important moments. I
also interpret some of the relative silence
about war powers as itself revealing.

I have long believed two things about
constitutional war powers, which my
reading of Noah Feldman’s “The Three
Lives of James Madison” largely confirmed.
First, James Madison was brilliant and
prescient about many things, but the
strategy and politics of war were not among
them. Second, modern constitutional critics
of an imperial presidency place too much
weight on the declare war clause—and
especially Madison’s statements about it.

Feldman divides the book into three “lives”
of Madison: genius, partisan, and
president. Those descriptors largely
correspond to three periods of Madison’s
tremendous constitutional influence. The
first focuses on Madison as constitutional
architect, in which he devoted his potent
intellect to solving, through structural
divisions and overlapping powers, a core
dilemma: how to centralize certain powers
needed for the new republic to survive and
thrive, while at the same time preserving
broad distribution of power, including
among the states. The second describes
Madison as a political partisan in
Congress—one who originally feared the
rise of “factions” but comes to lead one with
Jefferson, “the Republicans,” against
Alexander Hamilton and “the Federalists.”
The third covers Madison as a foreign
policy executive, including eight years as
President Jefferson’s secretary of state and

Madison, indeed, worried deeply about
unchecked presidential war powers. But
Feldman’s book shows that Madison did
not emphasize the same risks and checks
so often ascribed to him today, especially by
congressionalists who invoke Madison’s
statements about war-initiation.
Feldman’s Madisons
Let me start with a preliminary note about
the book, which I really enjoyed.
Discussions of constitutional war power
issues make up only a very small part of the
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eight years as president. Much of that
decade and a half is spent wrestling with
how to protect U.S. interests against
stronger foreign powers, ultimately
including waging a Second Revolutionary
War against Britain (the War of 1812) that
Madison had tried unsuccessfully to avoid.

Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress” (Clause 16).
The militia clauses should be read in
tandem with the Army and Navy clauses,
which give Congress the powers to “raise
and support Armies” (Clause 12) and to
“provide and maintain a Navy” (Clause 13).
The Army clause contains an important
restriction—a restriction applicable to only
one power—that “no Appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years.”

Feldman’s book traces several evolutions in
Madison’s thinking, including his thinking
about war. Overall it is a story of grand
theory and idealism yielding some ground
to experience and pragmatism. I came
away from it unimpressed by Madison’s
early thinking about war powers but
respecting his willingness to revisit and
even reverse some of his prior assumptions
while also holding firm to certain key
principles.

Article II Section 2 later familiarly states
that, in addition to holding “the Executive
power,”
the
President
“shall
be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United
States.”

Madison and War Powers in Theory
Tellingly, the declare war clause doesn’t
feature heavily in the book. It doesn’t really
come up at all in Feldman’s story of
Madison’s first “life” as constitutional
inventor. That is because Madison
expected other, more important structural
checks to operate before war declaration
even became an option. It’s Congress’s
control
of
spending
on
military
preparedness and the preservation of state
militias that appear many times, that loom
much larger in Madison’s thinking about
checks, and that were nearly his own
undoing as commander in chief.

Though Part I of Feldman’s book hardly
mentions the declare war clause—and with
it, the broader issue of war initiation—I
suspect this is not because Madison the
constitutional
architect
thought
it
unimportant. Quite the contrary, he and
many other drafters thought it so clearly
necessary that it didn’t generate as much
debate or require as much defense as some
other provisions related to war and
defense—even though it was quite a radical
departure from the British system and
predominant thinking. True, there was
some disagreement (a small minority of
delegates proposed vesting the power to
declare war in the president or the Senate,
and there is a famous moment when a
proposal that Congress be given power to
“make war” was changed to “declare” it).
But Madison and most other constitutional
architects who thought it much safer to
place the war declaration power in
Congress’s
hands met
with
little
resistance, and therefore didn’t need to
devote much energy to defending that
allocation or its precise boundaries. In fact,
from the framing and ratification periods
we have very little hard evidence of what
Madison said about the declare war
clause’s meaning, let alone what he really
thought.

Pretty much every student of the U.S.
Constitution knows that the declare war
clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11)
grants Congress the power to declare war.
Less remembered and certainly less
discussed these days is that the militia
clauses then provide that Congress shall
have power to “provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress
Insurrections
and
repel
Invasions” (Clause 15) and to “provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia, and for governing such Part of
them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the
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Far more than the declare war clause,
Feldman’s account of Madison’s thinking
and influence focuses on Congress’s other
powers over military resources as well as
the Militia Clauses. Madison and many
fellow
Republicans
saw
peacetime
demobilization of military forces—much of
them remaining in the form of local, parttime citizen-soldiers organized primarily at
the state level—as the more significant
check on war-making. Today we are used to
thinking about congressional control over
military purse-strings as, if anything,
mostly a back-end check, or a tool that
Congress might try to wield to terminate
military adventures. Madison saw it as a
front-end check, too, denying the president
much actual military power without
Congress’s considered support.

Although Feldman doesn’t discuss this part
of Madison’s Federalist 41, it is in that
essay that Madison describes these
interlocking checks. Madison starts by
quickly dismissing any question of whether
the national government must have the
power to declare war—“No man will
answer this question in the negative”—but
he doesn’t bother here addressing which
branch holds that power, because his
primary concern here is the instruments of
war. Madison’s main point is that the
Constitution was designed to make a large
standing army unnecessary and unlikely.
For starters, Madison argues in Federalist
41, “[t]he distance of the United States
from the powerful nations of the world”—
the Atlantic oceanic moat—would provide a
first line of defense. Next, “[t]he Union
itself which [the Constitution] cements and
secures, destroys every pretext for a
military establishment which could be
dangerous. America, united with a handful
of troops, or even without a single soldier,
exhibits a more forbidding posture to
foreign ambition than America disunited,
with one hundred thousand veterans ready
for combat.” This last point is a Madisonian
assumption that Feldman points out
throughout his book: A single, united
republic would be such an economic
powerhouse and trading partner that
extensive
national-level
military
institutions could remain small. “Next to
the effectual establishment of the Union”
itself as a check, Madison continues, “the
best possible precaution against danger
from standing armies, is a limitation of the
term for which revenue may be
appropriated to their support.” The Army
clause was carefully designed so that no
appropriations for it could last longer than
any House of Representatives term.

That is, rather than seeing the declare war
clause as the key brake on aggressive or
unnecessary presidential war-making,
Madison saw it as one among layers of
checks. At least as important, and probably
more important, were structural checks on
the very instrument of war-making:
namely, an army.
Madison did not expect Congress to raise
and support much of an army in peacetime.
He and fellow Republicans expected statelevel militias to provide much of the
defense forces necessary to supplement a
small national force. And militias were—in
both practical and legal senses—
necessarily defense forces: In accordance
with ancient British tradition, the militia
clauses restricted their national role to
executing law, suppression insurrections,
and repelling invasions. Madison never
went as far as some Republicans who
wanted the Constitution to forbid a
peacetime standing army altogether (see
his debate with fellow Virginian Patrick
Henry at page 235 of Feldman’s book). But
the Army clause contains a two-year
appropriation rule to make sure that, even
if an army was created and the president
was provided by Congress—or assumed
authority—to use it, funding for those
troops would run out quickly if Congress
did not replenish it.

I’ve wondered in the past how seriously to
take these arguments in the Federalist:
was this truly Madison’s thinking or
political salesmanship? I find convincing
the account in Richard H. Kohn’s Eagle and
Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of
the Military Establishments in America,
1783-1802 that most of the Framers, and
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especially those who experienced the
Revolutionary War first-hand, regarded a
national army as necessary and the militia
system as no substitute (see Kohn’s chapter
5).
But
Feldman’s
book
suggests
throughout that Madison’s own concern
about standing military establishment and
his faith in militias were actually quite
strong and genuine—even if not to the
same extent as more hardcore Republicans.

necessary).
This vision sets up one of the great
Madison-Hamilton divides over grand
strategy and the Constitution that
continues throughout American history.
For Madison, some limited, standing
military establishment was necessary, but
too much of it would result in unwarranted
militarism. His rival Alexander Hamilton
feared too little of it would undermine
deterrence and invite aggression by others.

In sum, Madison’s thinking about war
powers—perhaps better termed “defense
powers”— reflected two basic policies. One
was opposition to offensive or aggressive
war. The other was aversion to a large
standing army. These were closely related,
because Madison, like other Republicans,
saw standing armies as tools of aggressive
war, and both wars and standing armies
threatened balances and limitations of
domestic governance. Madison and many
Republicans
were
concerned
about
aggressive war and standing armies not
just because they opposed costly, militarily
hawkish foreign policy but because they
feared resulting tyranny at home.

II
Madison’s theory of war powers was
focused heavily on internal dangers to
liberty and republican governance from
war or standing armies. The allocation of
the declare war power to Congress played
only a small role in his theory. More
important were structural checks on
national-level military establishments,
especially constitutional provisions that
preserved state militias as the primary
source of military manpower and that
required Congress to fund—and then keep
funding—a national army. Without an
army, the president couldn’t fight a war
regardless of where the declare war power
laid.

As Feldman puts it:
To Madison, the message for
Americans was to avoid war, which not
only destroyed lives, wasted treasure,
and corrupted morals, but destroyed
“the equilibrium of the departments of
power.”
This
was
a
typically
Madisonian argument: War was hell—
especially because it broke down the
separation of powers. Even the mere
threat of war could produce the same
results: “An alarm is proclaimed—
Troops
are
raised—Taxes
are
imposed—officers military and civil are
created.” Then, even after “the danger
is repelled or disappears,” the standing
army, the taxes, and the government
offices ripe for political corruption
would all persist. (423)

Despite some important continuities, many
of parts of Madison’s theory failed in
practice during the early republic,
including his own presidency.
Madison and War Powers in Practice
Even in an 18th-century world in which the
international legal distinction between war
and peace was sharper than it is today,
Madison seemed caught off guard during
the
Washington
and
Adams
administrations by the degree to which
presidents could make major decisions for
the nation about war absent any
declaration by Congress. Upon his own rise
to the presidency, the state militia system
in which he placed much faith betrayed
him.

With these internal dangers of war—and
even preparedness for war—in mind,
Madison envisioned a set of overlapping
checks that operated prior to any war
declaration process (and afterwards if

Neutrality Controversy
The first major war episode that Feldman
details is the 1793 Neutrality Controversy,
in
which
President
Washington
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unilaterally announced a policy of
impartiality in the European war, rejecting
the view of Jefferson and substantial public
opinion that the United States should align
with France. To Washington and his chief
adviser Hamilton, this exercise of
presidential executive and diplomatic
powers was, in effect, declaring “not war”—
but to opponents like Madison it was a
usurpation of power over war/peace
decisions, nonetheless.

armed hostilities. Congress provided the
executive branch with naval and other
military resources and authorized, in an
escalating series of legislative acts, more
and more forceful measures.
Note that this was primarily a naval
conflict, which itself posed some challenges
for Madison’s war powers ideas (which
were mostly about armies). President
Adams had to convince Congress to
continue funding a Navy, and he was
cautious to get specific authorization for
using it. But that was probably an easier
political lift than supporting ground
hostilities, because armies were generally
seen as a greater risk to liberty (a feature
that, besides the need for longer-term
capital investment, is probably one reason
why the Navy Clause does not contain the
Army’s two-year limitation).

This was Madison’s first big practical
lesson that the movement from baseline
peace to exceptional war can take many
non-linear paths. The express provisions of
the Constitution—in particular the declare
war clause—would cover only some of
them.
In my view Hamilton bested Madison in
their dueling constitutional commentary
during this incident under the pseudonyms
Pacificus and Helvidius. Feldman also
points out, however, that the embryonic
executive branch was already nimble
enough to exercise foreign policy
leadership, and to fill in constitutional gaps
through its actions. Arguments were
important, but deeds were establishing
precedents for expanded presidential
diplomacy regarding war and peace. This
was especially true during the so-called
“Genêt affair,” when the French minister to
the United States tried to undermine
American neutrality by commissioning
privateers and threatening to take his case
directly to the public. “The theoretical
nature of Madison’s constitutional critique
of Pacificus was particularly ill-timed,”
writes Feldman. “As Madison was
ruminating about obscure details of the
separation of powers, Hamilton was
turning the Genêt affair into concrete
political gain.” (Page 381).

During that episode, Madison penned a
letter to Jefferson in which he famously
wrote his strongest statement about the
declare war clause:
The Constitution supposes what the
history
of
all
governments
demonstrates, that the executive is the
branch of power most interested in
war, and most prone to it. It has
accordingly with studied care, vested
the question of war in the legislature.
(Page 424, citing a 1798 letter to
Jefferson).
In some ways it is no surprise that Madison
emphasized Congress’s war power here:
Having realized what presidents could do
without formally declaring war, he
emphasized more than before that
Congress should be in charge.
Modern-day lawyers who oppose unilateral
resort to armed force by the president often
cite this statement about the war
declaration power in support of their views.
But Feldman’s book places it in context.
The legislature was, in fact, already quite
involved in decision-making, having
fulfilled requests for armaments and
authorized limited military actions.
Moreover, Adams was actually struggling
to avoid open conflict with France, not

Quasi-War with France
During the first Adams administration, the
United States and France waged an
undeclared military conflict mostly at sea
(1798-1800). French attacks on American
shipping, especially in the West Indies,
combined with other factors leading to
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baiting the nation into one.

standing army” (504). That may not have
seemed so problematic to Madison, who
had no intention of going to war. But
coercive diplomacy or deterrence backed up
by the threat of force were not possible
without a standing army, either. Nor was
an aggressive foreign economic policy that
risked escalating to or provoking war.

Madison seems blinded to these factors
because he wanted war to be a binary
condition—we were either at (declared)
war or not. He thought that approach
would make war easier to control.
“Madison reviled the idea of undeclared
war,” explains Feldman (Page 414). That’s
why Madison says the framers “vested the
question of war in the legislature” (my
emphasis). It is also why he goes on the say
that “the doctrines lately advanced,” by
which
he
means
congressional
authorization of limited military actions
without declaring war, “strike at the root of
all these provisions, and will deposit the
peace of the country in that department
which the Constitution distrusts as most
ready without cause to renounce it.”

So by 1811 Madison had learned a key
strategic lesson that cuts at his republican
theory of war powers: that a standing
military may be necessary for strategies—
like deterrence, or threatening an
escalation of economic measures—that
could prevent war. “With every avenue of
economic sanctions apparently exhausted,
all that remained to alter British policy
was war.” Feldman continues, “Ideally,
Madison would not actually have to use
force, just threaten it. To threaten credibly,
however, Madison would need to motivate
Congress to create a functional military”
(529)—something he had stood against.

But the Constitution needed to better fit
the realities and strategy of conflict, not the
other way around. And those realities
included that interstate conflict entails a
set of moves and countermoves, threats
and counter-threats, only sometimes
resulting in full-scale conflict for which a
legal declaration would be advantageous.

War of 1812
Having exhausted every form of economic
coercion he could muster, Madison turned
in 1812 to Congress for a war declaration,
which passed narrowly in both houses.
Although
United
States
ultimately
emerges victorious, it suffered major
setbacks throughout the war, including the
burning of Washington, D.C. Feldman
notes that “Congress had refused to give
Madison the troops he needed. Most of the
public had refused any sacrifice and
avoided military service. The militia had
frequently fled the field. The regular army
had performed doubtfully at best” (606-07).

Madison’s First Term as President
Madison served as secretary of state
throughout the Jefferson administration,
during which the United States was
pushed around by Britain on many fronts,
including in maritime commerce. Feldman
describes in detail how Madison and
Jefferson sought and failed to negotiate
British concessions through economic
coercion, and Madison inherits the
challenge when elected president.

The biggest military blunders involved
reliance on state militias, which Madison’s
republican theory of war powers placed at
the center of national defense. His military
strategy entailed invasion of Canada, but
New York militiamen refused to cross the
border, arguing that constitutionally they
could not be sent abroad on offensive
campaigns (recall that the militia clauses
restrict the purposes for which Congress
can call them forth: “to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and

Notwithstanding these and other security
challenges, in his 1809 inaugural address,
Madison clings to his republican concerns
about centralized military establishment,
warning that a standing army was a
danger to liberty and must therefore be
kept “within the requisite limits” while
“remembering that an armed and trained
militia is the firmest bulwark of republics”
(504).
As Feldman notes, of course, “[w]ar was not
a viable option for a republic without a
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repel Invasions”). Those militias that were
willing to cross the Canadian border fought
poorly—as one might expect of forces
designed for local defense. Madison “was
beginning to recognize that the federal
government might not be able to rely on
militia as he expected” (552).

those structural checks operated were
inevitable. The executive branch was filling
gaps in clear constitutional allocations of
war-related powers. Clear delineations
between war and peace were poorly
matched with the realities of conflict.
Heavy reliance on state militias had to give
way to standing national forces.

Eventually the United States repulsed
British forces and scored enough victories
to force a negotiated settlement. Feldman
describes how, in an important concession
to his experience over prior assumptions,
Madison acknowledged in a post-war
speech to Congress that: “Experience has
taught us” … that the “pacific dispositions
of the American people” and “their political
institutions” would not exempt the United
States from the need to fight wars. “A
certain degree of preparation” was
“indispensable to avert disaster” and would
also give “the best security for the
continuance of peace” (607).

III
“Congressionalists”—or those who hold
that Congress must authorize any
significant, hostile military intervention—
often overstate the historical importance of
the Declare War Clause and overvalue
Madison’s arguments for that position.
Indeed, many of today’s congressionalists
are doing what Madison did when he was
out of Congress and watching President
Adams wage an undeclared war against
France: falling back on formal text when
constitutional structure wasn’t working as
they would hope.

Madison’s proposals, ultimately adopted by
Congress, called for a modest standing
army (on the order of ten thousand troops)
and a small standing Navy. “The
recommendations were altogether logical
in the light of the experience of the previous
decade” (607)—not only the military
setbacks during the war but the efforts to
avoid war to begin with.

The Congressionalist View and
Madisonian War Powers
I do not mean to suggest that the
congressionalist view is singular and
unified; there are variations of it, with
different thresholds, standards, and
normative justifications. And my intent
here is not to litigate the entire debate
between
congressionalists
and
presidentialists, who hold that the
president has vast unilateral power to use
military force.

This concession to standing national forces
struck a balance in the decades that
followed between defense needs (and even
some territorial expansions through force)
and concerns about domestic centralization
of power. But it also laid the seeds for
greater and greater presidential discretion
in foreign policy as those standing forces
grew larger.

I do, however, think Feldman’s book helps
to debunk some common myths that
congressionalists often deploy. It also
bolsters several arguments that Philip
Bobbitt makes in his incisive review of
John Hart Ely’s “War and Responsibility”
(Michigan Law Review, 1994). Among
Bobbitt’s most important points is that,
yes, the framers intended war to be
legislatively
authorized,
but
that
legislative authorization role is more
complex and broader than the declare war
clause. Moreover, if we take Congress’s
other war-related powers seriously—in
particular, its control over creating and
equipping the military—we cannot just

***
Reality was tough on Madison’s theory of
war powers. Madison never proposed a
wholesale departure from reliance on
structural mechanisms to ensure that
defensive measures would not encroach on
American liberties, but he realized the
limits of his assumption that opening up
trade would prevent war. He came to
accept that significant adjustments in how
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ignore the fact that Congress has
affirmatively authorized a standing
military force without putting restrictions
on it.

president’s strategy is best understood as
intended to avoid full-scale war. More
generally, given how wrong Madison
turned out to be about the strategy of warprevention and the wielding of war threats,
the politics of going to war, and the
defensive needs even of the early Republic
in which he served, it is surprising that so
much stock is placed on these words.

Congressionalists sometimes begin by
noting that the declare war clause—and,
they argue by extension, the decision to
initiate military conflicts—was among the
most important power constitutional
allocations decided by the framers. Louis
Henkin asserted in his “Foreign Affairs and
the U.S. Constitution” that “[t]o the
Constitutional Fathers, one might guess,
the most important power in foreign
relations was the power to declare war.” In
his account of the Framers’ allocation of
powers in “The Imperial Presidency,”
Arthur Schlesinger called the declare car
clause “of prime importance.”

Declare War Clause as the Key Check?
In any event, congressionalists often take
the view that the Constitution was and
should designed to make it hard to initiate
war. They interpret the declare war clause
as a brake—or a second congressional key
that must be turned—on initiating military
conflict.
Elsewhere, from a strategic perspective, I
have written about how this view vastly
oversimplifies
war-prevention.
Empirically, political scientists have shown
that even absent formal congressional
declarations and authorizations of force,
Congress still wields substantial influence
over presidential decisions to use force.
From a historical perspective, Feldman’s
Madisons illustrate that if the Constitution
was designed to make war difficult to
initiate, the declare war clause was never
expected to do all, or even a lot, of that work
itself.

This is exaggerated and ahistorical, at
least as to Madison. Of greater importance
to Madison and his fellow Republicans
were the Constitution’s allocation of and
limitations
on
war-waging
tools:
congressionally checked spending on
military instruments (the Army Clause)
and reliance on state militias for military
manpower (the militia clauses).
Returning, however, to the declare war
clause, perhaps no quotation on war
powers by Madison gets more attention
than this one, discussed in the previous
essay: “The Constitution supposes what
the
history
of
all
governments
demonstrates, that the executive is the
branch of power most interested in war,
and most prone to it. It has accordingly
with studied care, vested the question of
war in the legislature.” It is one of those
statements so venerated by many lawyers
because Madison said it; it must therefore
be compelling.

Feldman’s story ends with the erosion of
other checks—most significantly the
acceptance of a standing, national army,
which gave presidents more unilateral
freedom of action. This has ever since put a
lot of strain on the declare war clause as a
final check. It has also produced the
illusion that the declare war clause is
Congress’s key power—and a dangerously
degraded
one—rather
than
seeing
Congress as continually exercising the
other important war powers vested in the
legislature. As Bobbitt describes it:

There are many reasons to question the
persuasiveness of that statement, however.
As explained in the previous essay,
Madison pens it during an episode—the
Quasi-War with France during the John
Adam administration—in which Congress
had extensively deliberated and legislated
about the military action, and the

Recall now that Congress’s role in
raising armies was, in the original
contemplation of the Framers, by no
means routine. The Framers did not
anticipate that the United States
would employ a large standing army, or
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that Congress would have to declare
war before raising one. Funding armed
forces was deemed to be of such
significance that any decision to field
an army had to be revisited every two
years (1390).

state, as well as expanded emergency
powers independent of war, have also given
the modern president levers of internal
control unimaginable to Madison.
Put another way, Madison feared that
presidents would be prone to war justify
their accumulation of resources and power
domestically; but modern presidents
already have so much of that at their
disposal. Sure, war is used to justify
additional exceptional measures (such as
expanded
wartime
detention
or
surveillance powers) and there may be
other political reasons why presidents
might find war advantageous. But a state
of war no longer unlocks anywhere near the
otherwise-sealed domestic presidential
power that it might have before the modern
administrative and national security state.

Bobbitt continues:
What confuses us today is the presence
of
standing
armies
whose
authorizations and appropriations
have become more or less routine, even
permanent parts of the statutory
background.
Thus
members
of
Congress are inclined to feel they have
authorized nothing—certainly not
hostile action—when they have
approved large, heavily armed forces
whose only justification can be that
they are prepared to fight (1390).

Conclusion

In other words, it is in part because other
checks on presidential war-making no
longer operate as originally envisioned that
the declare war clause now seems of
towering importance—it is, to many critics
of imperial presidentialism, the last check
standing.

To be clear, my point here is not an outright
defense of presidentialism, or that
congressionalists are wrong to push for
stronger legislative involvement in force
authorization. I think Congress does not
exercise its powers over war as much as it
should. My point is, rather, to cast doubt on
undue veneration for Founding Era
statements, especially taken out of their
historical and strategic context, and on a
false formalism with regard to the declare
war clause that many congressionalists
would not apply to other provisions.

But if the relative importance of the declare
war clause over other war power checks
has increased over time, a final lesson is
that the stakes of that power allocation
have changed dramatically since the
founding era, too. It is usually assumed
that the risks associated with warinitiation powers have increased because
war itself has become so much more
potentially destructive. But in other ways
the stakes are much lower today than
Madison assumed.

Feldman’s Madison is one who was
prepared to acknowledge—eventually—
that some of his war power principles
needed to be adapted to experience and
strategic reality. Those who revere
Madison today ought to bring that same
adaptive
approach
to
interpreting
constitutional war powers, including the
declare war clause.

Madison was concerned, of course, with the
foreign policy consequences of war, but
Feldman’s book shows that his bigger
concern was internal power balances. He
was concerned about the centralizing effect
of war on the instruments of government
and war preparation as well as about the
aggrandizement of executive power. But as
the growth in standing U.S. military forces
have
enabled
greater
presidential
discretion in U.S. security policy abroad,
the growth of the federal administrative

Matthew C. Waxman is the Liviu Librescu
Professor of Law at Columbia Law School.
Cite as Matthew C. Waxman, What’s So
Great About the Declare War Clause?, (Jan.
29, 2018) https://lawfareblog.com/whatsso-great-about-declare-war-clause.
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